Nor are these the only challenging problems facing the F-35 program. The F-35C naval variant's Hamilton Sundstrand power generator was mistakenly designed to only 65% of the required electric output. To accommodate the required increase, it will also be necessary to redesign the gearbox for the standard Pratt & Whitney F135 engine, which will be fitted into the conventional F-35A version as well as the naval F-35C. The contract announced by the US Department of Defense in August 2007 says that this engine update won't be ready for use until the end of 2009, which is almost the beginning of low-rate initial production.
Lockheed Martin can issue a subcontract to Hamilton Sundstrand to fix the F135's power generator without any publicity, and they have done so. As of December 1, 2007, neither Lockheed Martin's nor Hamilton Sundstrand's 2007 news archives show any trace of this award. Pratt & Whitney has a separate government contract for the F135 engine, however, and the award's size forces the Pentagon to announce the award under its rules for publicizing contracts.
Although it seemed probable that last October the JSF would fly again, a new problem arose. During a test run of the F135 engine, part of the engine was blown up by overheating. On November 14, 2007, an eyewitness took pictures of the transportation of a new F135 engine. The date for test flight number 20 (of the scheduled 5,000 test flights) is still unknown.
n an article that Bloomberg News publishes on August 31, 2007, it is announced that Lockheed Martin is exceeding the budget on the first phase of the Joint Strike Fighter program. The manufacturer warns that the reserves will be spent by the end of 2008, unless cuts are made. Lockheed Martin is seeking US Defense Department approval to lessen the number of test aircraft and personal plus hundreds of test flights to save money, and replenish a reserve fund.
It wants to build 2 fewer prototypes, and skip 800 of the 5,000 planned test flights. This after only 18 successful and 1 almost fatal testflight in half a year's time.
Officialy, Lockheed Martin says the reason for the rising deficit is: "the costs spent on redesigning a critical electronic part that failed during a May test flight." Redesign of something as crucial as control systems in this stage of such a complex project has to alert all involved partners and governments.
Questions in Dutch Parliament
This main threat to the Joint Strike Fighter program, in terms of growing costs and risks for planned delivery should have been made public long ago. In the Dutch parliament the Secretary of Defence was questioned on Monday 19 November when the facts about the JSF delay and rising costs were published in several Dutch newspapers on Sunday, November 18, 2007.
The overall Joint Strike Fighter program is now projected to cost $299 billion, 28% more than its estimate of $233 billion when it started in October 2001. The number of F-25 fighters to be produced, originally estimated at over 3,500, will not be higher than 2,300 in the initial production orders from all partners. Some US sources even speak about an estimated 1,700.
Australia has decided to buy the more traditional, but advanced and reliable F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet, in order to avoid any risks to their air defense stemming from F-35 schedule slips. Some NATO countries, including JSF partner nations Norway and Denmark, are considering other options entirely, instead of the JSF. One European candidate is the advanced but expensive twin-engined Eurofighter, already in service with the UK, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Austria. Another European candidate is the new Saab JAS-39 Gripen Demo, an advanced version of the proven Saab Gripen already operational with Sweden with NATO members the Czech Republic and Hungary.
While the F-35's embedded sensor arrays will continue to offer superior situational awareness, both of its biggest European alternatives are expected to have similar advanced AESA radars and electronics. They would also enter service with multi-role capabilities, without the development risks of the JSF. Saab's Gripen also claims a price per flight hour less than 60% of the JSF or Eurofighter.
The pattern to date is a disturbing one, where a string of difficulties that threaten to have serious impacts on the program's schedule and costs are minimized by the manufacturer and its industrial and governmental partners, or simply not announced. Note that until the recent set of questions in Parliament, the manufacturer succeeded in keeping politicians, the public, and most of the press unaware of the very serious fact that since May 3, 2007 the flight test program has been stopped completely.
Without sufficient transparency, it is difficult for the public to evaluate the fighter procurement choices that will have to be made in the coming years by governments all over Europe – and even more difficult to simply trust assertions that all will be well."
Source:
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/...roblems-04311/